

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01574 01 OF 02 021525Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
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L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 DOEE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5428
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01574

CW MESSAGE NO. 21

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ROUND
SEVEN: SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, JANUARY 27, 1978

1. SUMMARY: DURING SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, SOVIET DEL
CONTINUED ITS RESPONSE TO U.S. JANUARY 20 STATEMENT.
PRINCIPAL TOPIC WAS THE ISSUE OF RETENTION OF PROHIBITED
STOCKS AND FACILITIES, WITH SOVIETS ARGUING THAT THEIR
MAIN PROPOSED DECLARATIONS WOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT
SUCH RETENTION WOULD BE FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES ONLY. U.S.
DEL DEFERRED COMMENT PENDING COMPLETION OF SOVIET RESPONSE.
END SUMMARY.

2. THE SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE US-USSR NEGOTIA-
TIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) WAS HELD AFTERNOON JANUARY
27 AT SOVIET MISSION.
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01574 01 OF 02 021525Z

3. AMBASSADOR V.I. LIKHATCHEV (HEAD OF SOVIET DEL) CONTIN-
UED THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE U.S. JANUARY 20 STATEMENT,
FOCUSING ON THE ISSUE OF RETENTION OF STOCKS FOR NON-
HOSTILE PURPOSES (REVISED SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE X).
LIKHATCHEV SAID U.S. ASSERTION THAT SOVIET POSITION WAS
TO RETAIN "COMPLETE FREEDOM FOR EACH PARTY TO THE CONVEN-

TION IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF PROHIBITED CHEMICALS TO BE RETAINED" WAS INCORRECT. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS BASED ON TWO PREMISES: (A) "THE CONVENTION MUST NOT CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD CREATE OBSTACLES FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF STATES PARTIES OR FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES; AND (B) THE CONVENTION "MUST GUARANTEE AGAINST ANY PARTY ENGAGING IN PROHIBITED ACTIVITY UNDER THE GUISE OF PEACEFUL CHEMICAL PRODUCTION." LIKHACHEV SAID THAT SOVIET ARTICLE X, PARA 1, DID NOT GIVE STATES "FULL FREEDOM" TO PRODUCE OR RETAIN PROHIBITED CHEMICAL AGENTS, BUT LIMITED PRODUCTION AND RETENTION TO ONLY THOSE TYPES AND QUANTITIES WHICH EACH STATE DETERMINED TO BE "NECESSARY" FOR TECHNOLOGICAL, PROPHYLACTIC, PROTECTIVE (INCLUDING FIELD EXERCISES WITH TROOPS) AND OTHER PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

4. SOVIET CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT OF THE USDEL IS WITH PARA 2 OF SOVIET ARTICLE X, ACCORDING TO WHICH STATES PARTIES THEMSELVES WILL PERIODICALLY DECLARE TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS NEEDED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. HOWEVER, LIKHACHEV STRESSED, HAVING SOME SUPRANATIONAL BODY DETERMINE QUANTITIES ALLOWED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WOULD AMOUNT TO HAVING THAT SUPRANATIONAL BODY "LAY CLAIM" TO REGULATING VARIOUS STATES' CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES AND WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 01574 01 OF 02 021525Z

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE CONVENTION WAS INTENDED TO BE OF UNLIMITED DURATION AND THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE THE SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND MANY OTHER FACTORS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT EACH STATE'S REQUIREMENTS IN THE FUTURE.

5. LIKHACHEV STATED THAT STATES PARTIES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DECLARE THE TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS NECESSARY FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES NO LATER THAN 6 MONTHS AFTER TREATY ENTRY-INTO-FORCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT AGREED PERIODS. HE SAID THAT THE INITIAL DECLARATIONS WOULD BE MADE WITH A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF THE PURPOSE SUCH SUBSTANCES WOULD BE USED FOR (TECHNOLOGICAL, MEDICAL, RESEARCH, TROOP TRAINING IN FIELD CONDITIONS, ETC.). HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DEGREE OF DETAIL OF THESE DECLARATIONS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY EACH STATE PARTY. ACCORDING TO LIKHACHEV, THE DECLARATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE A FORM OF VERIFICATION; IF ANY STATE PARTY WERE TO DOUBT THAT ANOTHER STATE PARTY REALLY NEEDED ITS DECLARED TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR NONHOSTILE PURPOSES, THAT STATE COULD ASCERTAIN THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS BY CONSULTING WITH THE SUSPECTED PARTY,

BY REQUESTING CLARIFICATION FROM THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, OR BY RESORTING TO THE OTHER PROCEDURES SET OUT IN THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION.

6. LIKHACHEV CONCLUDED THAT, IN LIGHT OF WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID, PARA 3 OF SOVIET ARTICLE X (REGARDING FACILITIES PRODUCING PROHIBITED CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES) MUST ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN OBLIGATION LIMITING THE FREEDOM OF ACTION BY STATES PARTIES. THE TERM "APPROPRIATE CAPABILITY" IN PARA 3, HE SAID, IS "INEXTRICABLY CONNECTED" WITH PARAS 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE X.

7. LIKHACHEV ASSERTED THAT CONTRARY TO U.S. INTERPRETATION, ONLY PROTECTIVE ACTIVITIES COULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GENEVA 01574 01 OF 02 021525Z

THE SOVIET PROVISION FOR RETENTION OF STOCKS AND EQUIP-

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01574 02 OF 02 021524Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 01574

CW MESSAGE NO. 21

MENT FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES. HE ARGUED THAT CHEMICAL AGENTS WERE THE BASIC MEANS INVOLVED IN TROOP TRAINING AND THAT DELIVERY DEVICES HAD ONLY AN AUXILIARY ROLE.

CONSEQUENTLY, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO RETAIN OR PRODUCE ONLY THE QUANTITY OF DELIVERY DEVICES CORRESPONDING TO THE RETAINED QUANTITY OF AGENT; OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE DELIVERY DEVICES LEFT UNFILLED.

8. LIKHACHEV ILLUSTRATED HOW EACH STATE COULD CALCULATE THE POTENTIAL THREAT WHICH WOULD RESULT IF THE DECLARED QUANTITIES, PRODUCED OSTENSIBLY FOR NONHOSTILE PURPOSES, WERE USED INSTEAD FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES.

9. REGARDING THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF GENERAL INFORMATION ON STOCKS, PRIOR TO TREATY'S ENTRY INTO FORCE, LIKHACHEV SAID SUCH EXCHANGE WOULD AFFECT THE HIGHEST INTERESTS OF STATES I.E., SECURITY. HE REAFFIRMED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR DECLARATIONS OF STOCKS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, BUT STATED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AGREE
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01574 02 OF 02 021524Z

TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY BEFORE STATES WERE BOUND BY LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION. AMBASSADOR A.S. FISHER POINTED OUT THAT EXCHANGES BEFORE ENTRY INTO FORCE WERE INCLUDED IN OTHER TREATIES, WITHOUT DETRIMENTAL EFFECT TO THE SECURITY OF FUTURE STATE PARTIES, AND THAT, IN THE U.S. VIEW, PROVIDING FOR SUCH EXCHANGES IN A CW CONVENTION WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF STATES PARTIES.

10. FISHER DEFERRED FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL SOVIET SIDE CONCLUDES ITS RESPONSE. (A SOVIET STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION IS EXPECTED AT THE NEXT PLENARY.)

11. NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS SET FOR AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 1. NEXT MEETING OF THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS SCHEDULED FOR AFTERNOON JANUARY 30. SORENSON

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